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Although transition to entrepreneurship is a central subject in entrepreneurial studies, 
there is little research on its link with previous employer firm size. This study 
examines this relationship by utilizing a rich data set representing the entire 
Taiwanese labor market. While we found that smaller firms produce more 
entrepreneurs for all employees, the transitional probabilities of middle managers are 
higher in larger firms, indicating a specific firm size effect caused by organizational 
characteristics associated with position. In larger firms, the wide range of information 
that middle managers process facilitates entrepreneurial discoveries, and intense 
competition for senior management positions lowers opportunity costs. 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
In entrepreneurial studies, the relationship between the organizational characteristics 
of the previous employer and entrepreneurship by former employees has recently 
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 1begun to draw considerable attention (Klepper, 2002; Sørensen and Phillips, 2004). 
While many scholars have explored the choice of whether to opt for entrepreneurship, 
entrepreneurial choice (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994; Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000; 
Evans and Jovonovic, 1989; Evans and Leighton, 1989; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994), little 
attention has been paid to its link with employer firm size.   
To our knowledge, Blanchflower and Meyer (1994) provide possibly the first 
individual-level evidence that entrepreneurial entry declines as the employer increases 
in size, other factors being constant. Exploring this point further, Wagner (2004) 
preliminarily reports that employees of younger and smaller firms are more likely to 
step into self-employment. Similarly, Dobrev and Barnett (2005) argue that the 
likelihood of entrepreneurial entry has a negative relationship with both firm size and 
firm age.   
Each of these studies argues that entrepreneurial choice decreases as firm size 
increases, other factors being constant. The following might be the predominant 
reasons for these findings. First, in small businesses, managers directing 
entrepreneurial firms allow employees in close proximity to obtain a priori information 
on the entrepreneurial activities. According to both Sorensen and Audia (2000) and 
Wagner (2004), entrepreneurial information provided by small business managers 
tends to promote employees’ entry into entrepreneurship (“employer-as-a-role-model 
effect”). 
Dobrev and Barnett (2005) argue that in larger firms, which tend to have 
well-developed internal labor markets, the firm members are less likely to make 
contact with nonmembers, which results in lower recognition of external 
entrepreneurial opportunities. 
They also point out that institutionalized and well-funded corporate 
entrepreneurship in larger firms deters innovative members from leaving. Since many 
 2larger firms can provide sufficient incentives and resources to meet the demands of 
innovative members, the probability of entrepreneurial entry for employees in these 
firms is lower. 
Nevertheless, these studies pay little further attention to the possibility that the 
impact of employer size might vary according to the employee’s position within the 
firm. Given these dissimilar effects, it is possible that firm size exerts a specific 
influence on high-ranking employees facing entrepreneurial choice. This study 
examines the impact of firm size by taking employee position into consideration, using 
a rich data set on employer characteristics that represents the entire Taiwanese labor 
market. We first examine comprehensive impact of firm size on all employees. Next, in 
order to assess the specific effect on high-ranking employees apart from the 
comprehensive effect, we examine the difference in entrepreneurial choice between the 
middle managers of large firms and those of small firms, holding other parameters 
constant1. Although we certainly presume that middle managers are also affected by 
the comprehensive firm size effect, according to our hypothesis, other organizational 
characteristics, particularly those associated with employee position, influence middle 
managers’ entrepreneurial choices. 
In the economic literature, studies exploring the role of middle managers are 
primarily classified into two categories: team theory and incentive theory. These 
theories appear useful when we assess whether firm size exerts a specific influence on 
high-ranking employees apart from the comprehensive effect. Team theory focuses on 
the difference in tasks between a manager and subordinates. While subordinates 
undertake a variety of tasks, a middle manager specializes in coordinating these tasks. 
The middle manager supervises and monitors the effort levels of subordinates (Qian, 
1994), aggregates the external information of the firm analyzed by subordinates, 
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 3reports this information to the direct superior (Bolton and Dewatripont, 1994), and 
allocates managerial resources to subordinates (Cremer, 1980). A manager reads 
reports written by subordinates, summarizes them, and sends them to an upper 
stratum together with his/her own analysis of the external information. Under the 
assumption of sufficiently low communication costs between strata, the external 
information analyzed at the lower strata is continuously aggregated and summarized 
as it climbs up the hierarchy. Since the report has been repeatedly summarized by the 
time it reaches middle management, middle managers tend to have access to a wide 
range of external information. 
On the other hand, incentive theory treats the managerial hierarchy as providing an 
incentive for employees to perform productively (Lazear, 1981). A managerial position 
is a prize given to the most productive employee. The managerial hierarchy functions 
as a tournament, in which employees compete with each other in order to realize the 
expected returns from the prize. Aiming to win this competition, employees invest 
their own skills and improve their own productivity. 
In team theory, the external information at the middle management level is further 
summarized and generalized as the number of strata below middle management 
increases. In larger firms, which tend to have a stratified hierarchy, the number of 
workers in the layers below middle management increases exponentially. In the 
presence of information asymmetry, the middle managers of large firms can seek 
innovative ideas from information received from a wider range compared to their 
counterparts in small firms. Shane (2000) argues that when information is not 
uniformly distributed in society, potential entrepreneurs are more likely to discover 
opportunities related to prior knowledge obtained primarily through either education 
or work experience. Information processed by potential entrepreneurs in employer 
organizations plays a significant role in the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
 4For middle managers, the sizeable informational networks in large firms increase the 
necessity to work as communication hubs in the presence of informational flaws, and 
they need to possess a wide range of information. As a firm increases in size, the 
possibility of the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities by middle management 
might increase because those at this level are more likely to find opportunities that 
have not been identified by others due to the prior knowledge that greater scope 
provides2. 
Further, in team theory, middle managers should send reports to their superiors. 
They are also commissioned a certain share of managerial resources. Interactions with 
superiors appear to constitute a considerable portion of a middle manager’s tasks. 
Middle managers in small businesses tend to have frequent interactions with business 
owners, while their counterparts in larger firms typically do not have much contact 
with the principal decision-makers of their firms due to the several intervening strata. 
In the close interactions between small business owners and middle managers, in 
which they share information, the employer-as-a-role-model effect mentioned earlier 
might be distinctively multiplied. 
In incentive theory, the expected return from a prize in an employee’s prospects 
encourages him/her to enhance productivity. From the perspective of incentive theory, 
a possible promotion to a top management position serves as one of the greatest 
incentives for middle managers. The prospects of middle managers comprise the 
probability of promotion to senior management and the compensation for the position. 
While compensation in larger firms tends to be considerably higher, middle managers 
need to win more intense competition to advance to these positions. As firm size 
increases, competition becomes more intense and reduces the expected return from a 
possible promotion, thereby undermining the incentive for middle managers to remain 
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 5in the organization. This, in turn, may facilitate entry into entrepreneurial activities3. 
In summary, we need to test two opposing hypotheses. First, due to the greater 
recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities and the comparatively lower probability of 
promotion to senior management in larger firms, the middle managers of larger firms 
are more likely to enter entrepreneurship. The contrary hypothesis is derived from the 
augmented employer-as-a-role-model effect in the middle managements of small 
businesses. 
The empirical methods are presented in the following section. Due to characteristics 
unique to entrepreneurial transitional data, we need to address several methodological 
problems. The next section discusses these problems along with other empirical issues. 
The results are discussed in section III. We found that entrepreneurial entry declines 
with an increase in firm size for all employees, but increases with firm size in the case 
of middle managers. Section IV presents a summary, the implications of the results, 
the limitations of this study, and the future tasks. 
 
II.  Estimation Method 
 
The data used for this study were derived from Manpower Utilization Survey 2004, an 
annual governmental labor force survey in Taiwan. The scope of this survey included 
60,219 individuals from randomly selected households nationwide. Since we wished to 
employ data of employees, employees in the public sector and unpaid family laborers 
were excluded from our sample in order to estimate the effect of firm size more 
precisely. 
In addition, observations with missing values for data on spouses were omitted. We 
identified marital relationships according to each family member’s relationship with 
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 6the household head. For example, if a subject employee was a son of the household 
head, we identified the spouse as a family member whose family role was that of the 
son’s wife. However, if this family had two or more married sons, we could not uniquely 
specify the employee’s wife. This method also led to the exclusion of observations in 
which the spouse was living outside the target employee’s household. For this reason, 
63 observations were excluded from the study. 
Consequently, our sample comprised 17,395 employees in 2003. The survey was 
administered to workers in 2004. Among other things, they were asked if they had 
changed jobs in 2003 and the reason for the job change. There were 69 voluntary job 
changes with the aim of establishing a business. 
Our dependent variable representing entrepreneurial choice takes 1 if there was one 
voluntary resignation in 2003 with the aim of establishing a business, and 0 if the 
respondent had remained in the same job or had changed his/her job voluntarily for 
reasons other than establishing a business. In the entrepreneurial literature, many 
identify the entrepreneurial entry by checking whether an employee considered in a 
given year’s data became self-employed in the subsequent year, despite some 
measurement errors. On the other hand, our dependent variable, being a more precise 
variable, could capture the direct behavioral outcomes of entrepreneurial choice.   
As mentioned earlier, since we obtained our sample by tracing back from the 
working population in 2004 to entrepreneurial entrants in the previous year, those who 
had resigned from their jobs to establish businesses in 2003 but later entered the 
nonworking population in the subsequent year are automatically excluded from our 
sample. Hence, it is possible that our dependent variable may underestimate the 
actual number of entrants. 
The dependent variable, voluntary resignation from a paid job to establish a 
business, includes an extremely small number of 1s, since there were only 69 entrants 
 7in the entire sample of 17,395 observations. Data such as this are common in the study 
of entrepreneurial transition and are referred to as “rare events data.” In rare events 
data, the utilization of logisitic regression may inhibit accurate estimations because of 
finite sample bias. In order to remedy this possible bias, following King and Zeng 
(2001a; 2001b), we employed rare events logistic regression4. Our econometric model is 
as follows. 
( ) ( ) 1 ' 4 3 2 1 i i i i i M S S E
i ε β β β + + + + =
∗ β X  
E*
1 denotes the entrepreneurial choice of the ith observation, X denotes a vector of 
control variables and β1  is its coefficient vector, Si denotes firm size andβ2 is its 
coefficient, Mi represents a middle manager, andεi denotes unobservable errors. The 
comprehensive effect of firm size that affects all employees regardless of position is 
captured byβ2. The middle management position is defined by a dichotomous variable 
that takes 1 if an employee is the head of any of the following departments: production, 
accounts, sales, human resource, public relations, procurement, information, research 
and development, and others. In order to examine the specific firm size effect on 
middle managers, we decomposed the effect of the middle management variable into 
β4—a specific effect proportional to firm size—andβ3—which represents the other 
general effects of a middle management position. Practically, together with the firm 
size and middle management variables, an interaction variable that is defined by 
multiplying these two variables was introduced in the regression specification. Used 
together with the comprehensive firm size effect, the interaction variable could 
describe a component proportional to firm size in the case of the effect of middle 
management.  
However, in our rare events data, the number of entrants from middle management 
was considerably smaller than that of entrants from the entire sample. Our data could 
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 8only provide qualitative variables regarding which firm size class the employers were 
classified into. Due to the rare events feature of our data, some of the classes had no 
entry from middle management. If we utilize the several dummy variables assigned to 
the firm size classes, the values of our dependent variable corresponding to the 1s of 
some of the interaction variables (the middle manager dummy as well as the firm size 
class dummy equals 1) will not include 1 (no entry), in which case we will be unable to 
obtain estimates of the interaction variables. 
For this reason, despite some possibility of an increase in measurement errors we 
converted approximately this qualitative data to quantitative variables by substituting 
the average number of workers of Taiwanese firms within each size class according to 
the Industry, Commerce, and Service Census 20015. Other approximations obtained by 
substituting the lower limit of the size class (for example, one worker for a class with 
less than ten workers), the upper limit (nine workers for that class), or the median 
value (five workers for that class) yielded quite similar results in subsequent 
regression analyses. Our results do not appear to depend on the approximation method. 
The logarithm of this approximated firm size was employed as a regressor. 
With regard to control variables, gender differences were captured by a dichotomous 
variable representing females. While employees having spouses and more children are 
more likely to be risk averse, on the other hand, the emotional support from their 
families might encourage their entrepreneurial aspiration. In order to capture the 
possible heterogeneity arising from family structure, dichotomous variables for 
married employees and number of children under 18 years were employed as controls6. 
Employee age and the square of age were also utilized. The effect of age might be 
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6 Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994a; 1994b) analyzed entrepreneurial choice and the survival of the self-employed; they 
found that the coefficient estimate of the number of children under 18 years is not significantly different from 
zero. 
 9quadratic since age represents experience and amount of financial capital; however, at 
the same time, it signifies decreasing physical strength. 
As financial constraints might be relaxed if the employee’s spouse earns an income, 
we employed a dichotomous variable to represent the spouse earning an income in the 
labor market (this excludes unpaid family labor)7.  
In order to describe the effect of the employee’s education, our model included two 
dichotomous variables representing each level of education: junior college and 
university. Education appears to raise the returns from paid employment, thus 
lowering the probability of entrepreneurial entry. 
Finally, wages were introduced in our specification for two reasons. First, given the 
wage differentials between large- and small-firm employees, entrepreneurial success 
tends to result in a greater relative increase in the lifetime earnings of small business 
employees as compared to those of their counterparts in large firms, thereby leading 
more small business employees to enter.   
Second, the wages of middle managers are more strongly correlated with firm size, 
other factors being constant (Meagher and Wilson, 2004). As the hierarchy increases in 
size, middle managers are required to monitor more subordinates—which is necessary 
to elevate effort levels, and consequently receive greater earnings in return. Given the 
existence of wage differentials between middle managers in large and small firms even 
when observable and unobservable abilities are held constant, middle managers in 
larger firms are less likely to opt for entrepreneurial entry due to the greater 
opportunity costs involved. 
We held constant the future prospects and opportunity costs by introducing a wage 
variable in the regression equations. By means of this variable, the effects of firm size 
hypothesized earlier were distinguished from those of both lifetime earnings and 
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 10opportunity costs. 
Data on wages were available only for part of the sample from our data; therefore, 
we utilized predictions computed by an estimated wage function. The computation 
process is described in the Appendix.   
 
III.  Results 
 
Table I shows the rare events logit estimates of the determinants of entrepreneurial 
choice. In Model 1, as can be observed, the coefficient estimate of firm size is negative 
and significantly different from zero, implying that entrepreneurial entry declines with 
firm size, other factors being constant. Our finding is consistent with the suggestions 
of several previous studies. Smaller firms are more likely to produce entrepreneurs, 
the primary reason for which could be any of the following: the 
employer-as-a-role-model effect, more frequent contacts with external entrepreneurial 
opportunities, or the lack of institutional corporate entrepreneurship. In our data, 
while other parameters are evaluated at their mean values, the probability of 
entrepreneurial entry decreases by roughly 0.289 percent when the employer size 
moves from the smallest to the largest size class.   
The variable representing middle managers has a positive but insignificant 
coefficient. In Model 2, we decomposed this effect into a proportional effect to firm size 
and other general components by introducing an interaction variable. The coefficient 
estimate of the interaction variable, indicating the proportional effect, is significant 
and positive8. Even when we hold constant the comprehensive firm size effect and 
other controls, in the case of middle managers, entrepreneurial entry increases 
significantly with firm size, indicating that firm size exerts a specific influence on 
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 11middle managers. 
In Column 3 of Table I, we obtain Model 3 by adding predicted wage levels to Model 1. 
As can be observed, despite significant changes in the coefficient estimates of some 
controls, the estimate of firm size is still significant and negative. Similarly, in Column 
4 (Model 4), the main results in Model 2 are preserved even when we consider wage 
levels.  
 
[Insert Table I about here.] 
 
Figure I describes the changes in the predicted likelihood of entrepreneurial entry 
with changes in firm size. The entrepreneurial choice of all employees was predicted by 
Model 1 and that of middle managers was computed by Model 2 in Table I, while 
parameters other than the middle manager and firm size variables were evaluated at 
their mean values. As can be observed, the entrepreneurial entry of all employees 
declines with firm size. For middle managers, as the firm increases in size, β4—the 
specific firm size effect on middle managers—increases at a growing rate, while β
2—the comprehensive effect—exhibits a comparatively moderate change. As a result, 
the overall likelihood of the entrepreneurial entry of middle managers rises with firm 
size at an increasing rate. In our data, the likelihood of middle managers opting for 
entrepreneurship does not exceed that of all employees until the firm reaches the class 
with no less than 30 and less than 50 workers; however, the difference between these 
two likelihoods continuously expands in the subsequent firm size classes. 
This figure suggests that the entrepreneurial choice of middle managers differs 
significantly from the overall tendency. Organizational characteristics associated with 
position in the management hierarchy might be the primary factor causing this 
variation. 
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[Insert Figure I about here.] 
 
These results might imply that firm size exerts a specific effect on middle managers, 
and the effect raises the likelihood of entrepreneurial choice. Two organizational 
characteristics discussed earlier might be relevant. The range of information processed 
by middle management is broadened as the size of the hierarchy increases; this offers 
advantages in the quest for entrepreneurial opportunities. Owing to the stiff 
competition for senior management positions, middle managers of larger firms are 
more likely to leave their organizations. While the “employer-as-a-role-model effect” 
might be virtually augmented to a certain degree in the case of the middle 
management of a small business, in our data, it is not sufficiently large to negate the 
positive impacts of firm size.     
With regard to other controls, married employees are more likely to step into 
entrepreneurship, but they are less likely to do so when they have more children. 
Entrepreneurial entry increases rapidly with age among the younger cohort, but 
decreases at a gradual rate with age among the older cohort. This likelihood is 
maximized at the age of approximately 32 years, other factors being constant. This 
computation implies that the effect of physical strength slightly dominates those of 
experience and asset accumulation.   
The coefficient estimate of university is positive and significant in Models 1 and 2, 
implying that university graduates are more likely to opt for entrepreneurship. In 
Models 3 and 4, on the other hand, the significant effect is diminished when we include 
predicted wages. Although the coefficient estimates of wages are not significant, these 
results suggest that the effect of education on entrepreneurial choice is closely 
correlated with that of wages and possibly even with that of asset accumulation. The 
 13earnings of the spouse have a negative impact on entrepreneurial choice. One possible 
explanation for this is that if the spouse is working outside the home, the 
entrepreneurial firm cannot receive intrahousehold labor supply. 
With regard to the robustness of our results, it may be argued that there is an 
alternative interpretation. This might be led by considerations associated with family 
firms. In family firms, typically, family members are favored for promotion, while 
nonmembers face many obstacles. Many small businesses are owned by families, and 
in such firms, middle management positions tend to be occupied by family members. 
It may follow that low-ranking employees in small businesses are more likely to 
choose to be entrepreneurs because they face obstacles in promotion. In contrast, many 
middle managers in small businesses choose to remain in the employer firm since 
many of them are family members9. 
We attempted to identify family firms, although we had to rely on a relatively rough 
measure. We defined a family firm by checking whether more than one member of the 
household was simultaneously working for an identical firm. This definition is useful 
at least in this study, although it is certainly inadequate to capture the realities of 
family firms. Based on our definition, 3,812 employer firms were identified as family 
firms. 
We employed a dummy variable to represent family firms and added it to Model 2. 
The result showed that the coefficient estimates of both firm size and the interaction 
variable remained largely unchanged10. This result implies that even when we control 
factors associated with family firms, our major results remain unchanged. 
  
                                                  
9 Further, in large business groups, many family members tend to hold senior management positions. Since 
family control undermines middle managers’ incentives to remain in a large firm, this could yield another 
alternative interpretation explaining the greater number of entrants from the middle management in larger 
firms.   
10 Even when we defined another family business variable by narrowing our definition to firms owned by other 
members of the household, we obtained similar results. 
 14IV.  Conclusion 
 
A significant link between firm size and entrepreneurial choice is presented. Other 
factors being constant, entrepreneurial entry decreases with firm size. This implies 
that the organizational characteristics of employers are closely correlated with the 
choice behaviors that potential entrepreneurs show in those firms. 
  Among middle managers, we found a specific firm size effect apart from the 
comprehensive one. This specific effect suggests that the likelihood of middle 
managers’ entrepreneurial entry increases with an increase in firm size. The 
predominant reasons for this effect could be the broader range of information 
processed by middle managers in larger firms and the lower likelihood of their 
promotion to senior management. 
    The finding that smaller firms produce more entrepreneurs, ceteris paribus, 
highlights the role of the existing small business sector as the parent body of 
entrepreneurs. Since newly established firms are initially small, our findings imply 
that there exists a reproduction process in the small business sector, in which smaller 
firms create more entrepreneurs and the new firms that they establish are 
subsequently incorporated into the parent body. 
    In a process where incumbent organizations create new organizations, 
entrepreneurs play a mediating role. Our findings imply that organizational 
characteristics associated with employee position are important when we examine the 
effect of firm size on the choice of whether to become a mediator. It might follow that 
this choice is closely correlated with the difference between large and small incumbent 
organizations in terms of the manner in which workers become specialists. 
  Nevertheless, this study has several limitations. As mentioned earlier, our sample 
was obtained by tracing back from a working population in 2004 to entrants and 
 15nonentrants in the previous year. This method inevitably led to the exclusion from the 
sample of potential entrants who had virtually opted for entrepreneurial entry in 2003 
but were classified as nonworkers in the subsequent year. 
  Another data constraint is that we were unable to differentiate between potential 
entrepreneurs and employees without any entrepreneurial aspiration when exploring 
the comprehensive firm size effect for all employees. In the entrepreneurial transition, 
employees first become potential entrepreneurs when preparing to establish a 
business; the actual move to the entrepreneurial sector occurs in the second step. 
Potential entrepreneurs might differ from other employees in terms of labor market 
behavior and choice of workplace. When they are informed of the 
employer-as-a-role-model effect in smaller firms, for example, they may self-select to 
work for small business managers. In smaller firms, it is possible for a greater number 
of employees not to implement the first step, while for many large-firm employees, the 
two-step process is mostly required, which may increase heteroscedasticity in our data. 
 For future research, although we have shown a specific firm size effect on middle 
managers, it appears relevant to explore how the firm size effect exhibits variations in 
other organizational strata. The availability of data may provide further insights into 
the link between employer characteristics and entrepreneurial choice. 
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Appendix: The Wage Computation Process 
 
Wage data was available only for a subsample of 16,196 observations. We first 
estimated the determinants of wages in the logarithmic form by following the Mincer 
equation. The estimates are shown in Table AI. The specification contained basic 
controls, experience, education, and middle manager and firm size dummies. 
By utilizing this estimated function, we then projected the wages for all the 
observations. As data on working hours and tenure were unavailable for computation 
for the entire sample, these variables are evaluated at their mean values in the 
subsample. 
 
[Insert Table AI about here.] 
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Table I 
Determinants of Entrepreneurial Choice 
This table shows the rare event logit estimates of the determinants of entrepreneurial choice. Model 1 examines 
the comprehensive effect of firm size for all employees. The coefficient estimate of firm size is both negative and 
significant, implying that smaller firms produce more entrepreneurs, other factors being constant. In Model 2, we 
analyzed the specific effect on middle managers by introducing an interaction variable. The interaction effect was 
both positively and significantly estimated, implying that there exists a specific firm size effect apart from the 
comprehensive one and that an increase in firm size leads to an increase in entrepreneurial entry. Even in Models 
3 and 4, obtained by adding predicted prior wages to Models 1 and 2, respectively, we found similar results. 
Variable
Female -0.809 *** -0.809 *** -0.673 -0.834
(0.285) (0.286) (0.750) (0.772)
Married 1.463 *** 1.463 *** 1.439 *** 1.466 ***
(0.459) (0.459) (0.464) (0.460)
With Children -0.461 *** -0.466 *** -0.463 *** -0.465 ***
(0.177) (0.177) (0.177) (0.177)
Age 0.230 *** 0.229 *** 0.207 * 0.229 *
(0.084) (0.084) (0.122) (0.125)
Age
2/100 -0.336 *** -0.334 *** -0.306 ** -0.334 **
(0.113) (0.113) (0.153) (0.157)
Junior College 0.428 0.437 0.356 0.451
(0.327) (0.328) (0.495) (0.499)
University 0.713 *** 0.707 ** 0.570 0.738
(0.276) (0.285) (0.838) (0.865)
Firm Size -0.201 ** -0.236 ** -0.209 ** -0.231 **
(0.088) (0.095) (0.097) (0.102)
Middle Manager 0.613 -1.552 0.343 -1.494
(0.688) (1.618) (1.353) (1.947)
(Middle Manager)*(Firm Size) 0.543 * 0.540 *
(0.281) (0.286)
Working Spouse -1.000 *** -0.990 *** -1.001 *** -0.990 ***
(0.362) (0.364) (0.362) (0.364)
Professional 0.053 0.067 -0.062 0.088
(0.416) (0.419) (0.721) (0.744)
CSC Worker -0.029 -0.057 -0.055 -0.052
(0.427) (0.426) (0.459) (0.462)
Service Worker 1.640 *** 1.594 *** 1.617 *** 1.597 ***
(0.416) (0.412) (0.427) (0.427)
Manufacturing -0.483 -0.500 -0.482 -0.501
(0.379) (0.381) (0.380) (0.382)
Construction -1.499 * -1.518 * -1.498 * -1.520 *
(0.798) (0.799) (0.799) (0.800)
Commerce -0.216 -0.206 -0.240 -0.203
(0.342) (0.341) (0.377) (0.377)
Logistics and Communication -0.057 -0.062 -0.144 -0.048
(0.608) (0.609) (0.747) (0.761)
Finance and Real Estate -0.222 -0.187 -0.290 -0.179
(0.629) (0.628) (0.728) (0.734)
Business Service 0.423 0.417 0.365 0.427
(0.505) (0.505) (0.598) (0.599)
Predicted Wage 0.548 -0.099
(2.646) (2.727)
Constant -8.562 *** -8.457 *** -10.934 -7.970
(1.521) (1.510) (11.820) (12.155)
Log Likelihood 79.76 83.20 79.78 83.21
Sample Size 17395 17395 17395 17395
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4
 
The figures in parentheses are standard errors. *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 




The Predicted Likelihood of Entrepreneurial Entry, 
  Middle Managers, and All Employees 
This figure illustrates the changes in the likelihood of entrepreneurial entry for either all employees or middle 
managers according to firm size. In the case of all employees, entrepreneurial entry gradually decreases with firm 
size. On the other hand, due to the specific firm size effect, middle managers’ likelihood of entrepreneurial entry 
increases at a growing rate. In firms that have fewer than 30 workers, the likelihood of middle managers’ 
entrepreneurial entry is lower than that of all employees. However, in a size class of no less than 30 workers, 









1-9 10-29 30-49 50-99 100-499 500+

















    A Summary of Variables 
Variable Number of 
Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation Min Max
Entrepreneurial Choice 17395 0.004 0.063 0 1
Female 17395 0.439 0.496 0 1
Married 17395 0.523 0.499 0 1
Number of Children 17395 0.669 1.006 0 12
Age 17395 35.966 10.550 15 78
Age
2/100 17395 14.048 8.209 2.250 60.840
Junior College 17395 0.176 0.381 0 1
University 17395 0.159 0.365 0 1
Firm Size 17395 2.920 1.973 0.903 7.381
Middle Manager 17395 0.026 0.160 0 1
(Middle Manager)*(Firm Size) 17395 0.104 0.704 0.000 7.381
Working Spouse  17395 0.352 0.478 0 1
Predicted Wage 17395 5.342 0.269 4.350 6.393
Professional 17395 0.265 0.442 0 1
CSC Worker 17395 0.326 0.469 0 1
Service Worker 17395 0.071 0.258 0 1
Manufacturing 17395 0.382 0.486 0 1
Construction 17395 0.102 0.303 0 1
Commerce 17395 0.197 0.397 0 1
Logistics and Communication 17395 0.044 0.204 0 1
Finance and Real Estate 17395 0.059 0.235 0 1




  A  Correlation  Matrix 
1234567
1 Entrepreneurial Choice 1.000
2 Female -0.015 1.000
3 Married 0.002 -0.043 1.000
4 Children -0.007 -0.048 0.635 1.000
5 Age -0.008 -0.092 0.520 0.139 1.000
6 Age
2/100 -0.009 -0.087 0.478 0.073 0.988 1.000
7 Junior College 0.002 0.049 -0.058 -0.018 -0.147 -0.152 1.000
8 University 0.010 -0.008 -0.094 -0.064 -0.105 -0.110 -0.201
9 Firm Size -0.021 0.002 0.039 0.034 -0.021 -0.034 0.124
10 Middle Manager 0.007 -0.086 0.101 0.072 0.100 0.090 0.025
11 (Middle Manager)*(Firm Size) 0.012 -0.082 0.092 0.071 0.084 0.075 0.020
12 Working Spouse  -0.016 0.114 0.703 0.480 0.288 0.244 -0.016
13 Predicted Wage 0.013 -0.472 0.150 0.178 0.051 -0.005 0.206
8 9 10 11 12 13 14
8 Junior College 1.000
9 University -0.201 1.000
10 Firm Size 0.124 0.256 1.000
11 Middle Manager 0.025 0.154 0.089 1.000
12 (Middle Manager)*(Firm Size) 0.020 0.170 0.145 0.904 1.000
13 Working Spouse  -0.016 -0.039 0.060 0.064 0.054 1.000
14 Predicted Wage 0.206 0.554 0.392 0.394 0.381 0.096 1.000  
Controls pertaining to occupations and industries are not shown due to space constraints. 
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Table AI 


























CSC Worker 0.041 ***
(0.007)  
Service Worker 0.031 ***
(0.012)  




Commerce 0.009  
(0.008)  
Logistics and Communication 0.155 ***
(0.014)  
Finance and Real Estate 0.137 ***
(0.012)  
Business Service 0.119 ***
(0.016)  






Sample Size 16196    
The figures in parentheses are standard errors. *** denotes significance at the 1% level.   
** denotes significance at the 5% level. * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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